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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case
Petitioner Steven Leslie Williams (Williams) requests this Court to review the
decision of the Idaho Transportation Department (lTD) to disqualify the commercial
driving privileges (CDL) of Williams for life.
B. Course of Proceedings
On October 13, 2008 and on June 12, 2010, Williams was arrested for Driving
Under the Influence (DUI) and failed evidentiary breath testing for alcohol. At the time,
Williams was the holder of an Idaho CDL. On June 17, 2010, the Department mailed
Williams a Notice of Lifetime Disqualification (Notice). The Notice stated that "your
privilege to operate a commercial vehicle is being disqualified for your lifetime ... " Id.
On or about July 6, 2010, Williams requested an administrative hearing to contest the
action by lTD with respect to his CDL. A Notice of Telephone Hearing (notice of
hearing) was sent to Williams on July 15,2010.
The administrative hearing was held on July 23, 2010. On July 29, 2010 the
hearing officer issued his decision, in which he upheld the CDL disqualification. On
September 29, 2010, Williams filed a Petition for Judicial Review. The hearing on the
Petition for Judicial Review was held on May 27, 2011. The District Court issued its
decision on July 18, 2011. Williams filed Notice of Appeal on August 26, 2011 and an
Amended Notice of Appeal on September 14,2011. After suspension of the appeal by the
Supreme Court, the District Court issued its Final Judgment on September 25, 2011. 1

I On September 14, 2011 the Idaho Supreme Court suspended the appeal and remanded the matter because
no fmal order had been entered by the District Court. On September 26, 2011, the District Court issued its
Final Judgment.
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C. Statement of the Facts
The underlying facts are not in dispute. On October 13, 2008 and on June 12,
2010, Williams was arrested for Driving Under the Influence (DUI) and failed
evidentiary breath testing for alcohol. On both occasions, Williams was operating a noncommercial vehicle and at both times, Williams held an Idaho Class A driver's license
(CDL).
At the time of Williams' arrest for the second DUI, Idaho Code Section 49-335

2

provided in pertinent part as follows:

(1) Any person who operates a commercial motor vehicle or who holds a class A,
B or C driver's license is disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle
for a period of not less than one (1) year if convicted in the form of a judgment or
withheld judgment of a first violation under any state or federal law of:
(a) Operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or a controlled
substance;

***
(2) Any person who operates a commercial motor vehicle or who holds a class A,
B or C driver's license is disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle
for a period of not less than one(1) year if the person refuses to submit to or
submits to and fails a test to determine the driver's alcohol, drug or other
intoxicating substances concentration while operating a motor vehicle.

***
(4) A person is disqualified for the period of time specified in 49 CFR part 383 if
found to have committed two (2) or more of any of the offenses specified in
subsection (1) or (2) of this section, or any combination of those offenses, arising
from two (2) or more separate incidents. [emphasis added].

2 On July 1,2007 Idaho Code Section 49-335 was modified to subject a driver with a CDL to
disqualification if the driver fails a test for alcohol whether the person is operating a commercial vehicle or
not.
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Also, at the time of the second DUI arrest, 49 CFR 383.51 of the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration stated that a second incident required that the holder of
CDL be disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle for life.
On June 17, 2010, the Department mailed Williams a Notice of Lifetime
Disqualification (Notice) because the Department's records showed the Williams had
failed more than one evidentiary test as defined by law. The Notice stated that "your
privilege to operate a commercial vehicle is being disqualified for your lifetime ... "
The Notice invited Williams to request an administrative hearing to contest the
Department's action. On or about July 6, 2010, Williams requested an administrative
hearing to contest the action by ITD with respect to his CDL. A Notice of Telephone
Hearing (notice of hearing) was sent to Williams on July 15,2010. This notice of hearing
stated a date and time for the hearing and identified the hearing officer. The notice of
hearing also stated in part:
The hearing will be conducted according to the provisions of Title 67, Chapter 52,
Idaho Code, and the rules of practice and procedures of the Idaho Transportation
Department. The hearing provides you or your attorney an opportunity to appeal
on your behalf.
The administrative hearing was held on July, 23, 2010. On July 29, 2010 the
hearing officer issued his decision, in which he upheld the CDL disqualification. R. pages
7-20. On September 29,2010, Williams filed a Petition for Judicial Review.

The Petition for Judicial Review was heard by District Court Judge Lansing
Haynes. After his review ofthe record, briefing and arguments of counsel, Judge Haynes
rejected the arguments raised by Williams and correctly upheld the lifetime
disqualification of his CDL. This appeal followed.
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II.

THE LEGAL ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT

ITD will address the issues raised in the Petition for Judicial Review and
Petitioner's Brief.

The four issues3 raised by the Petitioner regarding the CDL are

summarized as follows:
1.

Was the decision ofITD made in violation of the 5th and 6th amendment to
the Constitution (Double Jeopardy)?

2.

Was the decision of lTD made in violation of Idaho Code section 188002A, due process and equal protection (void for vagueness)?

3.

Was the decision of ITD arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion
and/or in excess of the authority ofITD?

4.

Is Idaho Code Section 49-335(4) and 49 CRF part 383 which provides for
a lifetime CDL disqualification cruel and unusual punishment?

III.

ARGUMENT

A. Legal Standard on Appeal
In this appeal the burden of proof is on the petitioner. In order to vacate or remand
the decision of the hearing officer, Williams must establish that the decision of the
hearing officer was: (a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in excess
of the statutory authority of the agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) not
supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or (e) arbitrary, capricious, or
an abuse of discretion.
Generally, in a Petition for Judicial Review, the court reviews the agency's
underlying decision. The scope of review is such that "[t]he court shall not substitute its
judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact."
Idaho Code Section 67-5279. The scope of review is such that this Court must uphold the
3 The procedural due process issue has been abandoned by the petitioner on this appeal. See footnote
number 2 in Appellant's Brief, page 3.
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hearing officer's conclusions oflaw unless those conclusions oflaw fall within the
enumerated violations set forth in Idaho Code Section 67-5379 (3) (a-e).
The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IDAP A) governs the review of
department decisions to deny, cancel, suspend, disqualify, revoke or restrict a person's
driver's license. See I.C. §§ 49-201,49-330,67-5201(2),67-5270 and In re Suspension of
Driver's License ofGibbar, 143 Idaho 937, 155 P.3d 1176 (CLApp. 2006). In an appeal

from the decision of the district court acting in its appellate capacity under IDAP A, this
Court reviews the agency record independently of the district court's decision. Marshall
v. Idaho Dep't ofTransp., 137 Idaho 337, 340,48 P.3d 666, 669 (Ct.App.2002). This

Court does not substitute its jUdgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the
evidence presented. I.C. § 67-5279(1); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340,48 P.3d at 669. This
Court instead defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.
Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho 923, 926,950 P.2d 1262, 1265 (1998);
Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. In other words, the agency's factual

determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even where there is conflicting
evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are supported by substantial
competent evidence in the record. Urrutia v. Blaine County, ex reI. Bd. of Comm 's, 134
Idaho 353,357,2 P.3d 738, 742 (2000); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669.
A court may overturn an agency's decision where its findings, inferences,
conclusions, or decisions: (a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the
agency's statutory authority; (c) are made upon unlawful procedure; (d) are not supported
by substantial evidence in the record; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion. I.C. § 67-5279(3). The party challenging the agency decision must

- 5-

demonstrate that the agency erred in a manner specified in I.C. § 67-5279(3) and that a
substantial right of that party has been prejudiced. Price v. Payette County Bd o/County

Comm'rs, 131 Idaho 426, 429, 958 P.2d 583,586 (1998). Ifthe agency's decision is not
affirmed on appeal, "it shall be set aside ... and remanded for further proceedings as
necessary." I.C. § 67-5279(3).
The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law, over which the Court
exercises de novo review. In State v Bennett, 142 Idaho 166, 125 P.3d 522 (2005), the
court explained:

The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law, over which this Court
exercises de novo review. The party challenging a statute on constitutional
grounds bears the burden of establishing that the statute is unconstitutional and
"must overcome a strong presumption of validity." An appellate court is obligated
to seek an interpretation of a statute that will uphold its constitutionality.
Additionally, "it is a general rule that 'a legislative act should be held to be
constitutional until it is shown beyond a reasonable doubt that it is not so, and that
a law should not be held to be void for repugnancy to the Constitution in a
doubtful case.' "

Id, at 169 [citations omitted].
B.

Legal Arguments Presented on Appeal
1. NO VIOLATION OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY

Williams argues that, under the double jeopardy analysis by the United States
Supreme Court in Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450
(1997) (hereinafter Hudson), Idaho Code Section 49-335, violates double jeopardy in a
permanent ban for a CDL is disproportionate and unreasonable. As demonstrated below,
this argument is without merit.
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that no "person
[shall] be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy oflife or limb." The
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Double Jeopardy Clause protects against three abuses: a second prosecution for the same
offense after acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and
multiple criminal punishments for the same offense. See State v. McKeeth, 136 Idaho 619
(2001).

4

The third of these protections is at issue in this case.

In support of his legal argument, Williams provided the Court with extensive
briefing regarding the Hudson factors for analysis of the double jeopardy issue. Each of
the same factors argued in the Williams' Brief were recently argued by the petitioner in

Buell v. Idaho Department o/Transportation, 151 Idaho 257, 254 P.3d 1253 (Ct. App.
2011). The only difference between this appeal and the appeal in Buell is that Buell
applied to a one-year CDL disqualification.
The Idaho Court of Appeals performed a detailed analysis ofthe factors listed by
the Hudson court, and found the following:

Under Hudson, we must first determine whether the Idaho legislature
intended for the one-year CDL disqualification under I.C. § 49-335 to be civil or
criminal. Whether a statutory scheme is civil or criminal is a question of statutory
construction. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84,91, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 1146, 155 L.Ed.2d
164, 175-76 (2003). To determine the legislature'S intention, consideration should
be given to the statute's text and structure. Id. Although the text ofl.C. § 49-335
does not expressly state whether the statute is civil or criminal, the Idaho
legislature'S intention to create a civil proceeding is evidenced by its placement of
the CDL disqualification provisions within the motor vehicle code instead of the
criminal code. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346,361, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 208182, 13 8 L.Ed.2d 501, 514-15 (1997). The Idaho legislature had a civil remedial
purpose in creating the statute. As noted above, the purpose of I.C. § 49-335 is to
provide for public safety through the removal of problem drivers from the road by
license disqualification. Review of the statute suggests that the legislature did not
seek to create anything other than a civil scheme designed to protect the public
from harm. In addition, when the legislature gives authority to an administrative
agency we will presume that it intended to provide for a civil sanction. See
Hudson, 522 U.S. at 103, 118 S.Ct. at 495, 139 L.Ed.2d at 461-62. Here, the
authority to suspend a CDL was conferred by the legislature upon the ITD- a
The Petitioner does not contend that the Idaho Constitution affords any greater protections than the United
States Constitution, therefore this analysis shall focus of the United States Constitution.

4
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state agency. Therefore, we hold the legislature intended disqualification from
operating a commercial motor vehicle under I.C. § 49-335 to be a civil sanction.
Nevertheless, we must also inquire whether the statutory scheme
governing the CDL disqualification imposed upon Buell was so punitive either in
purpose or effect as to transform what was intended as a civil remedy into a
criminal penalty. To make this determination, we must weigh the seven factors
laid out in Hudson. It is important to note that these factors must be considered in
relation to the statute on its face and that only the clearest proof will suffice to
transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.
Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100, 118 S.Ct. at 493-94, 139 L.Ed.2d at 459-60. First, we
note that the disqualification of a CDL pursuant to I.C. § 49-335 does not impose
an affirmative disability or restraint that approaches criminal punishment on the
license holder. In Hudson, the petitioners were bank officers who were criminally
convicted for misapplication of bank funds. Subsequent to their criminal
convictions, the petitioners were also debarred from working in the banking
industry and were subject to monetary penalties. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 97, 118
S.Ct. at 492, 139 L.Ed.2d at 457-58. In holding that the additional civil penalties
did not rise to the level of criminal punishment for double jeopardy purposes, the
Hudson Court noted that, while the petitioners were prohibited from making their
livelihoods in the banking industry, the sanctions were nothing approaching the
infamous punishment of imprisonment. Id. at 104, 118 S.Ct. at 495-96, 139
L.Ed.2d at 462. Similarly, while a CDL disqualification prevents a CDL holder
from making his or her livelihood from driving commercial vehicles, it does not
impose a restraint that approaches the punishment of imprisonment. See Id.
Second, we must consider whether driver's license suspensions have been
regarded as punishment. Idaho appellate courts have not viewed driver's license
suspensions as punishment. See Talavera, 127 Idaho at 706,905 P.2d at 638;
McKeeth, 136 Idaho at 623,38 P.3d at 1279; State v. Gusman, 125 Idaho 810,
812-13,874 P.2d 1117, 1119-1120 (Ct.App.1993). See also United States. v.
Roberts, 845 F .2d 226, 228 (9th Cir.1988). Therefore, we hold that a CDL
disqualification has not historically been regarded as punishment.
Third, we must consider whether a one-year CDL disqualification comes
into play only on a finding of scienter. Under I.C. § 49-335(1)(a), the prerequisite
for a one-year CDL disqualification is conviction of a DUI. Under I.C. § 49335(2), the prerequisite for a one-year CDL disqualification is refusal or failure of
a BAC test. There is no scienter required for a disqualification under either
subpart.
Fourth, we must consider whether the behavior attached to the one-year
CDL disqualification is already a crime. We note that the conduct sanctioned in
the instant case is also criminalized by I.C. § 18-8004. However, this is
insufficient to transform the one-year CDL disqualification imposed on Buell into
a criminal punishment. See McKeeth, 136 Idaho at 624,38 P.3d at 1280. A statute
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that has some connection to a criminal violation is, by itself, far from the clearest
proof necessary to show that a sanction is criminal. Id.
Fifth, we must consider whether a one-year CDL disqualification
promotes the traditional aims of punishment, retribution, and deterrence. Buell,
citing to State v. Ankney, 109 Idaho 1, 704 P.2d 333 (1985), argues that, because a
driver's license is a valuable property right that cannot be taken away without
proper due process, the suspension of a driver's license has a punitive criminal
element. There is no support in Ankney, however, for the proposition that the
suspension of a driver's license is punitive. The Court in Ankney held that, while a
driver does have a substantial right in his or her driver's license, the state's interest
in preventing intoxicated persons from driving far outweighs the individual's
interest, especially because the individual is entitled to a prompt post-seizure
hearing. Ankney, 109 Idaho at 5, 704 P.2d at 337. This holding supports the
conclusion that the state has a strong remedial and nonpunitive reason for
suspending driver's licenses. We recognize that a one-year CDL disqualification
will have a deterrent effect, which is a traditional goal of criminal punishment.
However, deterrence may serve civil as well as criminal goals. Hudson, 522 U.S.
at 105, 118 S.Ct. at 496, 139 L.Ed.2d at 462-63; McKeeth, 136 Idaho at 624,38
P.3d at 1280. For example, the sanctions at issue here, while intended to deter
future wrongdoing, also serve to provide for the safety of the public at-large. To
hold that the mere presence of a deterrent purpose renders such sanctions criminal
for double jeopardy purposes would severely undermine the state's ability to
engage in effective regulation of driver's licenses. Therefore, we hold the mere
presence of a deterrent effect is insufficient to render a one-year CDL
disqualification criminal.
Sixth, we must consider whether there is a purpose other than punishment
that could be assigned to the one-year CDL disqualification and whether the
disqualification is excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned to it.
As noted above, the purpose ofLC. § 49-335 is to remove problem drivers from
the road through disqualification. Statement of Purpose, SB 1001 (1989). The
right of a citizen to operate a motor vehicle is substantial, but it is also subject to
reasonable regulation by the state in the exercise of its police powers. Talavera,
127 Idaho at 705,905 P.2d at 638. When a person is approved for a CDL, he or
she agrees to abide by certain conditions and regulations. Id. The commercial
driving industry is highly regulated because of the size and weight of commercial
vehicles and the heightened danger they pose to the public should they be
misused. Impaired commercial drivers pose a unique danger to the public because
of the type of vehicles they operate. Therefore, disqualification of a CDL
indicates only that the holder has failed to comply with the agreed conditions, not
that he or she is being punished for a particular act. Id. Further, a one-year
disqualification from driving a commercial vehicle is not disproportionate to the
statute's legitimate remedial goal of keeping problem drivers off the roadways.
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Id, page 1258-60. Like the Court of Appeals in Buell, this Court should find that the
factors outlined in Hudson do not support a finding that the CDL disqualification violates
the principle of double jeopardy.
Williams apparently contends that the analysis of Buell should not apply here
because Buell faced a 90 day CDL disqualification while the Petitioner faces a lifetime
CDL disqualification. Here, Judge Haynes reviewed the analysis in Buell and the
arguments presented by the Petitioner. The District Court rejected Petitioner's arguments
and correctly held as follows:
This Court concludes that although Williams has a substantial right to earn
a living as a commercial vehicle driver, his right is subject to reasonable
regulation by the State of Idaho in its exercise of its police powers. Impaired
commercial drivers pose a unique danger to the public because of the type of
vehicle they operate. Therefore, based upon analysis of Hudson, supra, and In re
Buell, supra, this Court finds that a lifetime CDL disqualification is civil in nature
and does not rise to the level of a criminal punishment for double jeopardy
purposes.

R., page 13-14. A CDL endorsement to an Idaho driver's license is a privilege. It is a
privilege granted to those drivers who meet the statutory qualifications because CDL
drivers operate large trucks with gross weights over 26,000 pounds, buses which
transport more than sixteen (16) passengers and vehicles transporting hazardous
materials. See Idaho Code Section 49-123(2)(c). By definition, the operation of
commercial vehicles on the public roadways, poses a greater risk to the public. As such, a
CDL driver is thus subject to greater regulation by the State of Idaho. Clearly, this
regulation by the State is not criminal in nature but a civil sanction directed at CDL
operators with multiple violations of the DUI law. As such, there can be no violation of
double jeopardy.
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2. THE VOID FOR VAGUENESS DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY

Williams argues that Idaho Code § IS-S002 is unconstitutional as applied to him
because he was not notified of the consequences of submitting to a breath test and the
effect failing the test would have on his CDL. It is important to note that there was no
dispute the Williams was given the notice required by § lS-S002A. Therefore, Williams
argument is, in part, that the notice he was given was legally not sufficient and he should
have been given more notice that is currently required by statute. In effect, he invites the
court to add language to the statutory notice. This Court should decline his invitation
because there is simply no legal requirement that the arresting officer provide all
defendants of notice of the all the collateral effects that a breath test failure will have on
that person including the effect on the person's CDL.

A. Idaho Code §18-8002 does not apply to a CDL disqualification. This appeal
concerns the disqualification of a CDL pursuant to Idaho Code § 49-335. The distinction
between the ALS suspension and a CDL disqualification has been recently discussed and
explained by the Idaho Supreme Court in Wanner v. lTD, _ Idaho _ , 244 P.3d 1250
(2011).

In Wanner, the petitioner was charged with a DUI and requested an

administrative hearing regarding his driver's license suspension, but his request was not
made within seven days as required by I.C. § lS-S002A(7). lTD, acting in its
administrative capacity, denied the request as untimely. Wanner appealed to the district
court, arguing that the Notice did not provide sufficient notice regarding the effect of any
suspension on his commercial driving privileges and thereby denied him due process.
The Court stated:
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Wanner argues that the notice provided by I.C. § IS-S002A did not meet the
dictates of due process. This, he argues, excuses his untimely filing. However,
Wanner does not attempt to explain how his due process rights have been violated
by the suspension of his driver's license by operation of I. e. § IS-S002A; rather,
his argument focuses on the consequences to his CDL (the one-year
disqualification from the right to operate a commercial motor vehicle mandated
by I.C. § 49-335(2)). It is clear that Wanner does not seek to avoid the driver's
license suspension; rather, he seeks to avoid the one-year disqualification of his
commercial driving privileges. This is a consequence of the failed evidentiary test
that is independent and distinct from the suspension of Wanner's license under
I.C. § IS-S002A.
Our interpretation of these as two separate issues is based upon the
language of the relevant statutes. Idaho Code § IS-S002A refers to the suspension
of" the person's driver's license" and specifies the possibility of a temporary
permit after thirty days. I.C. § IS-S002A(5)(a). By contrast, I.e. § 49-335
provides that the holder of a CDL " is disqualified from operating a commercial
motor vehicle ... " I.C. § 49-335(2). Thus, the IS-S002A suspension governs
Wanner's driving privileges in toto, while the 49-335 suspension only applies to a
particular subset of driving privileges, i.e., Wanner's right to operate a commercial
vehicle.

Id., page 1252-3.

The Wanner Court went on to find that "[u]ntil such time as that

hearing is conducted, judicial intervention into the matter of Wanner's disqualification
from operating a commercial vehicle is premature." Id. Likewise, here Williams'
arguments regarding an ALS appeal are not relevant to this appeal regarding his CDL.
In Buell, the Court of Appeals also explained the importance differences between
Section IS-S002A and Section 49-335. One of the issues raised by Buell had to do with
the starting date for the disqualification. The Buell Court stated:
Buell argues that his due process rights were violated because I.C. §§ IS-S002,
IS-S002A, and 49-335 are ambiguous and did not adequately notify him of when
his CDL disqualification would begin. Idaho Code Sections IS-S002 and ISS002A are part of the criminal code. Idaho Code Section IS-S002 provides for
suspension of a noncommercial driver's license when a driver has refused to
submit to an evidentiary BAC test. Idaho Code Section IS-S002A provides for the
suspension of a driver's license when a driver has failed an evidentiary BAC test.
The motor vehicle code prescribes additional consequences that result from a
motorist's refusal to submit to evidentiary testing or for failing such testing. I.C. §
49-335. Idaho Code Section 49-335(1)(a) provides that a CDL holder will be
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disqualified from operating a commercial vehicle for one year if convicted of
driving under the influence. Idaho Code Section 49-335(2) provides that a CDL
holder will be disqualified from operating a commercial vehicle for one year if the
person refuses to submit to or fails a BAC evidentiary test. A disqualification
under I.e. § 49-335 is in addition to a suspension under I.C. §§ 18-8002 or 188002A and relates solely to the driver's CDL.
Id., page 1260. The Buell Court recognized that there are differences between the ALS
suspension provided by Idaho Code Section 18-8002A and the CDL disqualification in
that the CDL disqualification is in addition to the ALS suspension. Therefore, the CDL
disqualification relates solely to the driver's CDL.
B. There is no ambiguity. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Idaho Code

Section 18-8002 is relevant to this appeal, the statute is not ambiguous and does not
violate Williams' right to due process. The test to determine if a statute is ambiguous is
contained in State v. Browning, 123 Idaho 748, 852 P.2d 500 (Ct.App. 1993):
A statute is ambiguous when the meaning is so doubtful or obscure that
"reasonable minds might be uncertain or disagree as to its meaning." Hickman v.
Lunden, 78 Idaho 191, 195,300 P.2d 818,819 (1956). "However, ambiguity is
not established merely because different possible interpretations are presented to a
court. If this were the case then all statutes that are the subject oflitigation could
be considered ambiguous .... [A] statute is not ambiguous merely because an
astute mind can devise more than one interpretation of it." Rim View Trout Co. v.
Higginson, 121 Idaho 819, 823, 828 P.2d 848, 852 (1992).
Id., at 749.
The issue of notice was also addressed by the Court of Appeals in Buell. Buell
argued that §18-8002 was ambiguous and did not properly notify him of the
consequences to his CDL. The Court of Appeals rejected Buell's arguments and held:
A holder of a CDL is presumed to have knowledge of the laws governing CDLs.
See Wilson v. State, 133 Idaho 874, 880, 993 P.2d 1205, 1211 (Ct.App.2000).
Therefore, Buell was presumed to know that the disqualification of his CDL was
in addition to any suspensions he received under either I.C. §§ 18-8002 or 188002A.
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Id., page 1260.

Both the Court in Buell and District Court Judge Haynes cited Wilson v. State,
133 Idaho 874, 880, 993 P.2d 1205, 1211 (Ct. App. 2000), to support its holding that a
CDL holder is presumed to have knowledge of the law. In Wilson, the defendant
contended that he was not properly notified of the consequences and punishments of a
second DUI conviction at the time of the first conviction. The Court rejected his
arguments, stating:

It should also be noted that the 1992 revision to I.C. § 18-8005(7) is not the
reason Wilson finds himself before the court again. It was Wilson's own behavior
that resulted in his 1995 DUI charge and caused the updated I.C. § 18-8005(7) to
have an effect on the length of his sentence. Had Wilson not again chosen to drive
while under the influence, his prior DUIs would be irrelevant. As was said in
Nichols, supra, surely a defendant [133 Idaho 880] knows that ifhe or she is
arrested again for DUI, the punishment may be more harsh.

Finally, it is axiomatic that citizens are presumptively charged with knowledge of
the law once such laws are passed. Ignorance of the law is not a defense. "The
entire structure of our democratic government rests on the premise that the
individual citizen is capable of informing himself about the particular policies that
affect his destiny."
Id., page 879-880 [citations deleted]. Likewise, it is not the CDL law that caused

Williams to be in Court facing a lifetime disqualification ofthe CDL. It was Williams'
own behavior in failing a second evidentiary test that has caused him to be facing a
lifetime suspension of his CDL. Had Williams chosen not to drive under the influence a
second time, he would not face a lifetime disqualification.
The District Court Judge reviewed the arguments raised by the Petitioner and
holding ofthe Idaho Courts in Wanner and Buell where upon the District Court correctly
concluded:

- 14-

A holder of a CDL is presumed to have knowledge of the laws governing
CDLs. Wilson v. State, 133 Idaho 874, 880,993 P.2d 1205, 1211 (Ct. App. 2000).
Williams was presumed to know that the disqualification of his CDL was
in addition to any suspensions he received under I.C. Section 18-8002 or 188002A. Williams was also presumed to know the consequences if he was
convicted of any ofthe offenses listed in I.C. Section 49-335(1) or refused to
submit to or failed an evidentiary test pursuant to I.C. Section 49-335(2). He was
also presumed to know that his CDL would be suspended for life for two or more
major events as specified in I.C. Section 49-335 (1) or (2).
This Court finds that I.C. Sections 18-8002, 18-8002A and 49-335 are not
void for vagueness. There is no legal requirement that an arresting officer provide
notice of all the collateral effect that a breath test failure will have on one's CDL
endorsement. As a holder of a CDL, Williams was presumed to have such
knowledge.

R., page 15. Williams' argument that Idaho Code §18-8002A did not provide him with

adequate notice that there were implications to his CDL is without merit. The civil
sanction imposed by §49-335 is a consequence of the failed evidentiary test that is
independent and distinct from the suspension of Williams' driver's license under I.e. §

18-8002A. Furthermore, Williams, as the holder of a CDL, is presumed to have
knowledge of the law including the enhanced sanction that would occur if Williams
suffered a second failed evidentiary test.
3. THE RATIONAL BASIS TO A LEGITIMATE LEGISLATIVE
OBJECTIVE

Williams argues that the lifetime revocation [disqualification] of his CDL
endorsement is arbitrary and capricious, without a rational basis to any legitimate
legislative objective. This argument is without legal merit because there is a rational
basis for the law.
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Here, Idaho Code §49-335 and 49 CFR 383 provide that a person is disqualified
from operating a commercial motor vehicle for a lifetime if the person is found to have
committed two or more offenses as defined in Idaho Code § 49-335. 49 CFR
383.51(a)(3) specifically states that the driver is subject to the disqualifications whether
he is driving a commercial or non-commercial vehicle.
The relationship between the CDL disqualification in §49-335 and a remedial
purpose was discussed by the Court of Appeals in Buell. Citing both § 18-8002A and
§49-335, the Court of Appeals stated:
Were we to rely on Talavera, we would consider whether the one-year
disqualification of Buell's CDL, as applied to him, bears a rational relationship to
a legitimate remedial purpose. The Court in Talavera noted that the purpose of
I.C. § 18-8002A was to promote safety by quickly disqualifying drivers who pose
a hazard to the public at-large. Similarly, the remedial purpose ofI.C. § 49-335
is to provide for the safety of the public by removing problem drivers from
the road through disqualification. Statement of Purpose, SB 1001 (1989).
[emphasis added].
1d., page 1257.

In this case the District Court, after reviewing the law, statutes and arguments of
counsel correctly found the following:
Therefore, this Court concludes that there is a rational basis for Williams' lifetime
CDL suspension because the intent ofLC. Section 49-335 is to ensure public
safety by removing the CDL endorsement from those drivers who have taken and
failed two alcohol evidentiary tests. As such, there is a nexus between Williams'
lifetime CDL suspension and his failure of two DUI tests.
R., page 17.

Both the State and the Federal governments have an interest in ensuring safe
driving, especially among professional drivers who operate commercial vehicles on this
nation's roadways. The Idaho legislature and Federal government are well within their
rights to elect to strongly penalize CDL holders with respect to their commercial driving
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privileges when those CDL holders drive while intoxicated, and still allow those drivers
the limited ability to drive non-commercial vehicles. Any number of motivating factors
may have played into this legislative decision. For example, the Idaho legislature may
have believed that commercial vehicles pose a greater safety hazard to the public than
non-commercial vehicles in the hands of habitually intoxicated drivers. Therefore,
drivers with CDL endorsements who engage in prohibited alcohol conduct may be
identified and in certain circumstances removed from the road with respect to the
operation of commercial vehicles. Therefore, there is a rational relationship between the
conduct (driving while intoxicated) and the disqualification of a CDL.
4. NO CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
Williams argues that the CDL disqualification is cruel and unusual punishment.
Williams offered no factual support for this argument, other than that the lifetime
disqualification will affect Williams' future employment.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits "cruel and unusual punishment. " Here, as
discussed above, Idaho Code § 49-335 does not impose a punishment, it is regulatory in
nature. Therefore, it does not violate the Eighth Amendment.
Even if the Eighth Amendm'ent applies, it is important to note that the burden of
demonstrating that a sentence is cruel and unusual is on the person asserting the
constitutional violation. State v. Clay, 124 Idaho 329, 332, 859 P.2d 365, 368 (Ct. App.
1993). Therefore, in addition to the burden of proof which is upon Williams in this
appeal, Williams must also demonstrate that the civil sanction of a CDL disqualification
for a second offense is "cruel and unusual."
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In addition, the Eighth Amendment "does not reqUIre strict proportionality
between cnme and sentence" but "forbids only extreme sentences that are 'grossly
disproportionate' to the crime." Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001, 111 S.Ct.
2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (partially quoting Solem v.
Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288, 303, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983». Therefore, the

burden is on Williams to demonstrate the disqualification of his CDL is grossly
disproportionate to twice failing a breath test for alcohol while driving a vehicle. This,
Williams has not and can not do.
Generally, the definition of "cruel and unusual punishment" was outlined by the
Court in Nez Perce County v. Reese, 142 Idaho 893,136 P.3d 364 (et App 2006):
The Excessive Fines Clause] limits the government's power to extract
payments, whether in cash or in kind, as punishment for an offense. Forfeitures
are payments in kind and, thus, are fines if they constitute punishment for an
offense. A civil sanction that cannot fairly be said to solely serve a remedial
purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or
deterrent purposes, is punishment. [citations omitted].
Id., at 142 Idaho at 898, 136 P.3d at 369.
In support of this argument, petitioner discussed the Reese case which concerned
the issue of whether a fine was excessive. In Reese the court explained the factors the
court should focus on in evaluating the issue. The court stated:

In considering the gravity of the offense, factors for courts' consideration include
the nature and extent of the crime, whether the violation was related to other
criminal activities, the other penalties that may be imposed for the violation, and
the extent of harm caused. Judgments about appropriate punishment for an
offense belong in the first instance to the legislature. Thus, among the most
important factors when determining the gravity of the offense are other penalties
authorized by the legislature. Additionally, the culpability of the offender should
be examined specifically instead of examining the gravity of the crime in the
abstract. Courts may take into account the extent of both the defendant's and the
property's roles in the offense, the nature and scope of the illegal operation at
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issue, the personal benefit reaped by the defendant, and the value of the
contraband involved in the offense.
To determine the proportionality of the forfeiture, relevant factors include,
but are not limited to, the fair market value of the property, the intangible or
subjective value of the property, and the hardship to the defendant. Courts have
considered the property's character as a residence and the effect of forfeiture on
innocent occupants or children when evaluating the subjective value of the
property or the harshness of the forfeiture. Courts may also take into account any
other sanctions imposed upon the defendant by the sovereign seeking forfeiture.
Additionally, the effect of forfeiture on the defendant's family or financial
circumstances is relevant.
Id, page 897 (citations omitted).

After his review, the District Court correctly concluded that Idaho Code §49-335
does not impose a criminal punishment but is a civil sanction that serves a remedial
purpose and therefore did not violate the Eighth amendment. R., page 18. Further,

the

District Court held that, even if the Eighth Amendment applied, the petitioner failed to
demonstrate that the CDL disqualification was "cruel and unusual." The District Court
held:
In applying the Reese hardship analysis, Williams must do more than
show the loss of his CDL endorsement means the loss of his ability to earn a
living as a heavy equipment mechanic. The loss does not take away his driver's
license, only his CDL endorsement. Williams can still seek employment that does
not involve a CDL.
Therefore, this Court concludes that a lifetime suspension of a CDL for
failure of two evidentiary tests is not cruel and unusual punishment because a
CDL suspension is a civil sanction that serves a remedial purpose. Alternatively,
Williams' lifetime CD L suspension does not create such an extreme hardship that
it rises to the level of cruel and unusual punishment.

R., page 18.
Here, Williams offered no evidence other than that the loss of his CDL means the
loss of his employment as a heavy equipment mechanic. The disqualification of his CDL
does not take away Williams' driver's license, just the CDL endorsement. It does not
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infringe on his right to seek, obtain and maintain a job, just jobs that require a CDL. The
loss of particular employment would be true of almost any CDL endorsed driver who is
subjected to a lifetime disqualification. Loss of employment as a commercial driver is
not cruel and unusual punishment, it is clearly the intent of the law.
CONCLUSION

The lifetime disqualification imposed by Idaho Code § 49-335 is a civil sanction,
rationally related to a legitimate legislative interest of insuring public safety on the
roadways. As such, lTD respectfully requests that this Court upholds the decision of the
District Court and of the hearing officer and uphold the disqualification of the petitioner's
CDL endorsement for life.

Dated April 24, 2012.
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